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Abstract
With the Global Financial Crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the looming
Climate Change, investors and policymakers around the world are bracing for
a new global environment with heightened tail risk. Asymmetric exposure to
this risk across countries raises the private and social value of arrangements im-
proving insurance. We offer an analytical decomposition of the welfare effects of
efficient capital market integration into a “smoothing” and a “level effect”. En-
hancing risk sharing affects the volatility of consumption, but also brings about
equilibrium adjustment in asset and goods prices. This in turn drives relative
wealth and consumption, as well as labor and capital allocation, across bor-
ders. Using model simulation, we explore quantitatively the empirical relevance
of the different channels through which riskier and safer countries benefit from
sharing macroeconomic risk. We offer an algorithm for the correct solution of
the equilibrium using DSGE models under complete markets, at higher order of
approximation.
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1 Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis, the sovereign risk crisis in the euro-area, the early ef-
fects of the looming Climate Change and more recently the COVID-19 pandemic have
progressively exposed the lack of resilience of the global economy to large financial
and macroeconomic distress and disasters. Policymakers around the world are bracing
for a new global environment with heightened tail risk—the risk of rare but disrup-
tive events. Agents’ perceptions of tail risk may hinder economic recovery from large
disturbances (Baker et al., 2020), or even weigh on long-term growth prospects (Ko-
zlowski et al., 2020). While the recent large crises have a strong global component,
it has become increasingly clear that regions and countries have a very different ex-
posure to disaster shocks. Global crises and tail events transmit quite asymmetrically
across borders, widening the international divide in wealth and welfare. Hence tail risk,
even when associated to global disturbances, raises the value of international risk shar-
ing, achievable either through capital market development and integration, or through
institutional arrangements.
In the context of heightened perception of tail risk, risk sharing arrangements
at global level are seen as highly desirable as they give regions and countries oppor-
tunities for smoothing consumption and moderate the costs of adjustment to adverse
shocks. However, insuring disaster risk has potentially significant macroeconomic and
financial implications. For any given distribution of fundamentals, going from a low
to a high degree of risk insurance changes the equilibrium valuation of national assets.
Any change in asset pricing in turn translates into an equilibrium adjustment in rel-
ative wealth and demand, possibly leading to a re-allocation of labor and production
across regions and countries. This means that insurance may also affect trade and the
international prices of goods.
In this paper, we study the joint financial, macroeconomic and welfare im-
plications of enhancing risk sharing in the presence of disaster risk. In the tradition
of open macroeconomics, we focus on GDP fluctuations as the fundamental source of
macroeconomic risk. Drawing on financial theory and asset pricing, we bring forward
the analysis of kurtosis and skewness, in addition to variance, in the distribution of
the variable underlying macroeconomic risk. Relative to the literature, thus, we ex-
plicitly account for cross-border heterogeneity in both second and higher moments of
the distribution of national GDP. For analytical clarity and tractability, we focus our
analysis by contrasting the extreme cases of financial autarky (no role for insurance via
financial markets) to complete markets (perfect insurance).1 We carry out our analysis
1This guarantees that, in the absence of economic distortions, trade in financial assets will unam-
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both analytically and numerically, setting parameters based on evidence on the GDP
distribution across countries.
To motivate our analysis, we present a set of stylized facts on the variance,
kurtosis and the skewness of output for a large sample of countries. We show that, first,
that there is substantial heterogeneity in these moments across countries. Second, the
variance of output is positively correlated with kurtosis but negatively correlated to
skewness. As one would expect, especially in light of the past decades of data, higher
volatility of output is associated with higher frequency of large downturns.
Our theoretical contribution is twofold. First, we offer a novel decomposition
of the gains from risk sharing into a “smoothing effect” (SE) and a “level effect”
(LE). The former captures welfare gains from risk diversification in terms of the
distribution of marginal utility growth. The latter synthesizes welfare gains or losses
through the average consumption of goods and leisure. These in turn materialize
via interrelated channels. The relative wealth channel works via the revaluation of
a country assets, including physical, financial and human capital, at the equilibrium
prices with perfect insurance (relative to imperfect insurance). Asset prices reflect
any adjustment not only in the equilibrium discount factor, but also in the (average)
international price of a country’s output —the good price channel—, associated to
the equilibrium reallocation of production and demand. We specifically highlight the
terms of trade as a novel channel by which perfect insurance may affect social welfare:
for a given relative wealth, the country experiencing an improvement in its average
terms of trade gains in higher consumption and lower labor effort. An important
advantage of our decomposition consists of clarifying how varying the relative riskiness
of national GDPs may move the smoothing and level effects (SE and LE) in opposite
directions. Riskier countries gain in terms of smoother consumption and labor, but lose
out in terms of average consumption and labor effort. Our decomposition maps these
movements into aggregate quantities and prices. Intuitively, these movements are the
general equilibrium analog of a premium paid or received by a country to benefit from
or offer macro insurance.
Second, we derive analytically and numerically the independent and joint con-
tribution of different moments of the GDP distribution to a country’s gains from risk
sharing, by different channels. We show that smoothing and level effects tend to com-
pensate each other with asymmetries in second moments (volatility of income)–with
substantial macroeconomic adjustment to risk sharing via relative wealth and terms of
trade movements. With fat tails asymmetric to the left (third and fourth moments) in
biguously bring about positive welfare gains.
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the distribution of GDP, the gains from risk sharing are instead dominated by improve-
ment in consumption smoothing of the riskier country. Relative safe countries gain in
terms of higher average asset prices and better average terms of trade. Model simula-
tions accounting for the correlation across moments based on country-pair comparison
corroborate the empirical relevance of both the smoothing and the level components of
the gains from risk sharing. Overall, tail risk enhances the relative gains from capital
market integration of countries that are more exposed to it–our empirically-motivated
exercise suggests that riskier countries have a potential relative gains advantage for
riskier up to 10 percentage points of the total gains from risk sharing. This relative ad-
vantage however results from different contributions from the SE and LE components
of the gains across countries. In relative terms, the consumption smoothing component
can contribute up to a 15 percentage point advantage for riskier countries. The level
effect component produces relative gains and losses up to 10% of the total gains from
risk sharing.
We carry out our study, both analytically and numerically, using perturba-
tion methods.2 For the purpose of studying tail risk, these methods are preferable to
alternative (global) methods, as they naturally yield a decomposition of the solution in
the higher moments of the data generating process. As a methodological contribution
to the literature, we spell out a theoretically consistent algorithm applicable in general
equilibrium models. The algorithm yields an efficient solution to the problem of solving
for the initial distribution of wealth under complete markets, using perturbation. The
usefulness of this contribution is best appreciated in light of a widespread practice in
the literature, consisting of omitting the specification of the budget constraint under
the assumption of complete markets. This practice is not necessarily consequential
when countries are assumed to be sufficiently symmetrical in economic structure and
distribution of disturbances. It becomes problematic in exercises realistically allowing
for large asymmetries in structure and risk across borders, as omitting the budget con-
straint from the solution algorithm rules out by construction the level effect component
driving the gains from risk sharing.3
Analytical tractability allows us to explore in detail how the structure of the
economy translate the properties of the fundamental process driving output into income
risk. We provide insight on non-loglinearities in the economic structure that drive the
transmission of tail risk, and specifically discuss how income risk varies with the intra-
and intertemporal elasticity of substitution. For some parameterizations of the model,
2See e.g. Holmes (1995), Judd (1998), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), Lombardo and Sutherland
(2007), Kim et al. (2008), Andreasen et al. (2018), and Lombardo and Uhlig (2018).
3It is easy to produce examples where a model solved using this practice erroneously predicts
welfare losses for a country when moving from autarky to complete markets.
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standard in the literature, we are able to derive sharp and instructive propositions. One
instance is the proposition of “equal gains” from risk sharing, applied to symmetric
countries differing only in the volatility of output: asymmetries in risk do not translate
into differences in welfare gains, but only affect the composition of these gains. The
riskier country gains more in consumption smoothing, the other benefits from higher
average consumption.
Our decomposition of the gains from risk sharing into smoothing and level
effects has policy relevance. In the policy literature, the gains from risk sharing are typ-
ically assessed in terms of consumption smoothing only (e.g. Viñals (2015), Constâncio
(2016)), i.e. it focuses only on the first leg of our decomposition. Consistently, most
of the empirical evidence and indicators of risk sharing published in policy reports
are based on measures of consumption volatility and cross country correlations of con-
sumption.4 Relying on these indicators to assess international risk diversification raises
a number of logical issues. As shown in our analysis, the SE is only one component
of the total gains from diversification: an assessment of these gains based on these
indicators is at best incomplete. When a relatively safe and a relatively risky country
integrate their capital markets, it is plausible that the safe country mainly gains in
term of higher average wealth and consumption, and despite diversification may even
loose out in terms of consumption volatility. By no means this implies that the safe
country derives no gain from asset trade, as the wealth and consumption level effects
of asset revaluation at the new equilibrium price would more than compensate losses
in smoothing, if any. Vice versa, the risky country is likely to lose out in terms of rela-
tive wealth and consumption. The “implicit transfer” via asset revaluation and terms
of trade adjustment is typically disregarded in policy debate, arguably because it is
difficult to quantify. Yet, it is a key channel through which countries benefit from the
integration of frictionless financial markets.5 This channel cannot be ignored in policy
debates on the pros and cons of capital market integration among countries differing
in their risk profile and economic features.
Our analysis draws on a long standing body of literature highlighting the
effects of higher moments on asset prices and risk premia. Early on, Samuelson (1970)
already warned against limiting the analysis of optimal portfolio choices to first and
4The empirical literature is large. See for example Obstfeld (1994) and the literature review in
Kose et al. (2009). One popular approach consists of testing directly the consumption risk-sharing
condition, which predicts a perfect correlation of consumption growth of two economies trading in
complete financial markets. Another popular approach measures the correlation between domestic
consumption growth and domestic output growth: the more a country is globally financially integrated,
the less domestic consumption depends on idiosyncratic domestic disturbances.
5This point is apparent in the theoretical literature, starting from textbook treatments (e.g.
Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012), and including recent research (e.g. Engel, 2016; Coeurdacier et al.,
2019).
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second moments (mean-variance models), which in his view can be justified only in
limiting cases. In general, higher moments co-determine the values of assets and the
degree of hedging they can provide. Ingersoll (1975) emphasizes that skewness plays
a role in determining efficient portfolio frontiers, in a way conceptually similar to the
role of second moments. Indeed, Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) extend the CAPM to
include the third moment, showing that such an extension substantially improves the
empirical fit of the model. Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Smith (2007) argue that
conditional systematic co-skewness of returns helps addressing the empirical puzzle of
the failure of the market beta to explain the cross section of expected returns. More
recently, Bekaert and Engstrom (2017) build a consumption-based asset pricing model
that can generate skewness of consumption growth as well as the negative correlation of
such skewness with the option-implied volatility, as observed in the data.6 Hence, from
an international finance perspective, differences in higher moments of cross-country
returns can have important implication for relative asset prices. Finally Fang and Lai
(1997) extend the analysis of asset pricing to the fourth moment. They show that
investors seek compensation for higher variance and kurtosis, while willing to forgo
compensation for higher skewness.
At the same time, our paper follows the tradition of international macroeco-
nomics, stressing that not only relative asset price, but also relative good prices are
key to understanding cross-border aggregate risk (eg Cole and Obstfeld, 1991).7 A
direction of research combining insight from finance and open macro to study tail risk
is still relatively unexplored in the international macroeconomics literature,8, but can
be expected to become dominant in light of recent crisis (see the growing body of
contribution on “growth at risk”, e.g. Adrian et al. (2019).)
Our paper speaks directly to the large theoretical and empirical literature on
the gains and extent of risk sharing across countries, e.g. Lewis (1996), van Wincoop
(1994), van Wincoop (1999), Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) and Lewis and Liu
(2015). Our analysis is also in line with recent literature, stressing that, to the extent
that cross-border insurance allows countries to reduce their reliance on precautionary
saving, it may also lead to significant reallocation of capital across borders (a point
discussed by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), Coeurdacier et al. (2019)).
6Guvenen et al. (2018) show that idiosyncratic income fluctuations display non-Gaussian features.
They show that skewness and kurtosis affect the welfare costs of incomplete insurance.
7In our analysis, asset and good prices together drive the gains from risk sharing at different
“orders of risk”. We will specifically detail how GDP volatility translates into income risk, as a
function of risk aversion and trade elasticity, i.e. the degree of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods.
8The international macroeconomics literature has limited the analysis of risk to first and second
moments (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). This is particularly the case for the vast literature that
uses second-order approximations to evaluate optimal policies.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents stylized facts
on the distribution of output growth, showing that variance, skewness and kurtosis (of
GDP) are substantially heterogeneous across borders. Section 3 specifies the model.
Section 4 presents higher order solution to the model and Section 5 discusses allocations
under complete markets. Section 6 carries out an analytical decomposition of the
gains from risk sharing by moment and channels. Section 7 presents and discusses our
numerical results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Volatility and fat tails in the distribution of out-
put: a cross country analysis
International macroeconomic and finance has long focused on output volatility as
the main source of macroeconomic risk driving asset prices and motivating portfo-
lio diversification and risk sharing arrangement across borders (see for example Uribe
and Schmitt-Grohé (2017)). The global financial crisis (GFC) and more recently the
COVID-19 pandemic together with rising concerns about climate change have brought
forward the need to improve our understanding of fat-tail and especially left-tail risks.
To set the stage of our study, we present basic stylized facts about the cross-
country joint distribution of output. Figure 1 shows the cross-section density function
of the three moments of the first difference of log per-capita real GDP (PWT, 9.1).
A first notable result is heterogeneity across countries: all the moments appear to
be quite disperse and with a pronounced long tail. A relatively small fraction of
countries displays an exorbitant volatility. Moreover, for skewness, very large negative
values are much more likely than large positive ones. Table 1 shows percentiles of the
distributions. Differences in moments are considerable, even leaving out the extreme
tails of the distribution. A country in the 95% of the distribution would have about
97% of the total variance if combined with a country in the lowest 5%, and about 85%
of the total variance if combined with the median country. For skewness and kurtosis
the 90% intervals are (−2.53, 1.06) and (−0.43, 10.28) respectively. Appendix D shows
the three moments of interest for the full list of countries.
The cross-country heterogeneity highlighted by Figure 1 and Table 1 motivates
our key question. Holding constant the global economy exposure to the risk of extreme
adverse realization of output, how would countries with a more negatively skewed
distribution (in the data, skewness for Mexico is -2.289) benefit from sharing aggregate
7
Figure 1: Distribution of moments across countries
Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Source: Penn World Table (9.1). GDP per capita at 2011 constant
prices; 1960-2017; 156 countries.
output risk with countries with a lower or no exposure to tail risk (in the data, some
countries even have a positively skewed distribution of output, as is the case for Ireland,
with a skewness of 1.876)?
The second and higher moments of the distribution are not uncorrelated.
We illustrate a second important empirical regularity using the simple cross-sectional
scatter plot displayed in Figure 2. The two panels report the (log) standard deviation
of per-capita GDP growth (first difference of log GDP per capita) on the horizontal
axis and the skewness (top panel) and excess kurtosis (bottom panel) of per-capita
GDP growth. As shown in the figure, the skewness and kurtosis of per-capita GDP
growth are correlated with the standard deviation. In related work (Corsetti et al.,
2021), we derive formal results, using both cross section analysis and panel regressions
(See also Bekaert and Popov, 2019).
The key takeaway from this section is straightforward. First, there is con-
siderable heterogeneity in all moments of output distribution. Second, in the data,
adverse macroeconomic tail risk tends to be associated with higher volatility of out-
put. A conjecture, recently revived by the literature (Kozlowski et al., 2020), is that
8
Figure 2: GDP-growth: Skewness and kurtosis against standard deviation.
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Table 1: Distribution of higher moments of GDP growth
Percentile Standard Deviation Skewness Excess Kurtosis
5% 2.71 -2.53 -0.43
25% 4.70 -1.00 0.43
50% 6.45 -0.42 1.66
75% 9.03 0.09 4.03
95% 15.59 1.06 10.28
Source: Penn World Table (9.1). GDP per capita at 2011 constant
prices; 1960-2017; 156 countries.
large shocks, such as COVID-19, may alter the way firms, households and government
perceive the risk distribution when taking decisions, possibly exacerbating both het-
erogeneity and correlation across moments. The observed distribution of moments and
their correlation are of course the result of structural factors and policies. Throughout
our analysis, however, we will take them as exogenous, consistent with the specific
aim of this paper, to inspect the determinants and channels of the gains from sharing
macroeconomic risk.
3 Model
Our baseline model is a canonical, discrete time, two-country, frictionless model with
differentiated goods and home bias in consumption. In each period the state of the
economy consists of a realization of the stochastic total-factor-productivity (TFP) pro-
cesses and a distribution of financial assets. The two countries, Home (H) and Foreign
(F ), are heterogeneous in size and distribution of their TFP processes—while symmet-
ric in all other parameters. Foreign variables are denoted by a superscript ∗. World
population size is normalized to unity, with country H population set to n ∈ (0, 1).
3.1 Firms
Each country produces a differentiated good. In each country an infinite number
of firms operate in perfectly competitive markets using a Cobb-Douglas technology
in capital (Kt) and labor (Lt), subject to an exogenous stochastic process for TFP.
To account for common and country specific component of TFP, we posit that each
country’s TFP is a geometric average of two underlying stochastic processes, Dt and
10


















where ι, ι∗, α ∈ (0, 1). Note that we write Dt and D∗t for convenience. One can think
of these processes as sector- or technology-specific, i.e. they don’t have a “national”
connotation. National TFP nonetheless depends on the country-specific mix adopted
by domestic firms.9 Goods markets are competitive. For tractability, we also posit
that the aggregate capital stock is constant throughout the analysis.
In each period the representative firm rents capital at rate rK,t and hires
workers at the real wage wt (in units of the consumption basket) from households to
solve the following problem:
min
Kt,Lt
rK,tKt + wtLt (3.3)
subject to the production function (3.1).








where pH,t is the price of domestic output relative to the consumer price index.
3.2 Consumer Problem
The representative agent in country H consumes a bundle of domestic and foreign goods
Ct, trades in units of capital at price PK,t, supplies labor Lt at a wage wt and capital Kt
at rate rK,t, to firms, and trades in Arrow-Debreu securities At+1, at the price Λt+1|t,
that pay one unit of consumption in period t + 1. Capital must be purchased one
9The sectoral composition of output can imply strong cross-country commonalities in TFP dis-
turbances. For example shocks hitting the IT sector (new processors, microchips shortages etc.), the
financial sector (new financial products, new payment systems, etc.) or the automobile sector (new
engines, new pollution standards, etc.) can simultaneously hit different countries, albeit to different
extents. This domestic diversification, generating cross-country commonalities, has strong implica-
tions for international risk sharing. Our model of TFP is meant to capture this considerations if only
in a stylized way.
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period in advance. All prices are in units of the consumption basket. Consumers thus






tU (Ct, Lt) (3.5)
subject to the individual budget constraint:
Ct + EtΛt+1|tAt+1 + PK,tKt+1 = rK,tKt + wtLt + At + PK,tKt. (3.6)
We consider two specifications of preferences, the standard CRRA form, where








and GHH preferences (Greenwood et al., 1988), where






(1− ρ)−1 . (3.8)
In either case, ρ > 0 is the degree of risk aversion, and ϕ > 0 is the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. One reason for using these specifications is comparability:
both are ubiquitous in the literature. Another reason is that, unlike CRRA preferences,
GHH preferences eliminate the wealth effect on labor supply. The comparison will be
useful in contrasting demand and supply effects driving the terms of trade.10

















where CH,t CF,t denote consumption of Home and Foreign goods, respectively, θ > 0
is the trade elasticity and ν ∈ (0, 1) is a function of relative size of countries, and the
degree of openness, λ ∈ (0, 1), such that (1−ν) = (1−n)λ. λ thus measures the degree
















10It should be noted that he empirical literature finds significant income effects in labor supply
estimations (e.g. Attanasio et al., 2018)
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with ν∗ = nλ. The relative prices associated with the above preferences obey the
following relationships:






















Ct + (1− ν∗)QθtC∗t ). (3.14)
The first order conditions are:
Ct : UC(Ct, Lt)− ζt = 0 (3.15a)
Lt : UL(Ct, Lt) + wtζt = 0 (3.15b)
At+1 : δζt − ζt−1Λt|t−1 = 0 (3.15c)
Kt+1 : PK,t = Etδ
ζt+1
ζt
(rk,t+1 + PK,t+1) , (3.15d)
where ζt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, and Λt|t−1 is the stochastic
discount factor (SDF).






The definition of equilibrium is standard and omitted to save space.
3.3 Productivity and Income Risk
Countries are heterogenous in terms of the aggregate TFP process, depending on the
country-specific mix of technologies, ι and ι∗. These differences ultimately drive the
relative income risk faced by residents in each country.
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For each technology, the stochastic process driving TFP follow an AR(1)
process in logs:11
lnDt = (1− ϕD) lnD̄ + ϕDlnDt−1 + ωσDεD,t; (3.17)
where the parameter ϕD ∈ (0, 1) measures the persistence of the TFP process, σD is
the standard deviation of the serially-uncorrelated exogenous innovation εD,t, ω is the
perturbation parameter (identical across countries) such that if ω = 0 the model is
deterministic, and a bar over variables indicate the deterministic steady state value.
An analogous process drives D∗.12
The probability distribution of εD,t plays a central role in the analysis. For
analytical clarity, we will carry out most of our analysis under the assumption that the
moments of log(Dt) and log(D
∗
t ) are mutually independent.
Assumption 1 (Probability distribution).
The probability distribution of the innovation εD,t is characterized by the fol-
lowing moments:




























(m− 1)! ! (Γγ)
m
2 if m is even AND m > 4










The m-th moment assumption coincides with the moments of a Gaussian dis-
11The specification of the stochastic process in the log of TFP has implications that we discuss
later in the paper. This assumption is ubiquitous in the macro literature and we adopt it as it greatly
simplifies the analysis.
12As we discuss further below, in this paper we use perturbation methods as described in Holmes
(1995) and Lombardo and Uhlig (2018).
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tribution. We will carry out our analysis up to the fourth order, allowing for departures
from Gaussianity.
Note that, by our assumption above, the distributions of log(Dt) and log(D
∗
t )
are mean-preserving. If this were not the case higher moments would affect the mean.
In this sense, our assumption will help us clarify the specific role of each moment in
the distribution of TFP in determining asset prices and the way a country gains from
risk sharing.13
The uncertainty generated by unexpected realizations of εD,t is the source
of risk for the households. There are various measures of risk in the literature. A
common approach consists of distinguishing between the quantity of risk, depending
on the covariance between the SDF and the return on the risky asset, and the price of
risk, depending on the mean of the SDF, e.g. Cochrane (2009). This approach may
not be ideal when higher moments play an important role, as pointed out by Harvey
and Siddique (2000). We prefer to adopt an intuitive and simple measure, using the
relative price of risky domestic assets under complete markets.
Namely, we assess relative risk across borders comparing the equilibrium value
of each country’s income stream at the complete-markets state price.
Definition 1 ((Inverse) Measure of Relative Risk). Relative risk is defined as a differ-
ence between home and foreign asset prices under complete markets:
RR :=
(
P cmK,t − P cmK∗,t
)
. (3.18)
If RR > 0, then the Home country is safer than the Foreign. This measure is
obviously not country-specific (i.e., it is the same for Home and Foreign residents), since
under complete markets the stochastic discount factor is equalized across all agents,
independently of where they reside.
We should note here that, in equilibrium, uncertainty about productivity
translates into uncertainty about income depending on the equilibrium realization of
goods prices. This in turn depends on structural parameters of the model, in particular
on trade elasticity θ and risk aversion ρ. In what follows we will discuss how relative
risk depends on the combination of these parameters.
13It will still be possible to gauge the effect of non mean-preserving spreads, i.e. effects of higher
moments on the first moment, by modelling how higher moments of TFP impinge on its mean value.
Specifically, one could draw on the empirical evidence in Section 2 to specify the interdependence
among moments parametrically.
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4 Higher Order Solution of the Model
We solve our model, both analytically and numerically, using perturbation methods.14
In doing so, we contribute to the literature a theoretically consistent algorithm generally
applicable in general equilibrium models. In this section, we first motivate and lay out
our solution method. Next we discuss the non-loglinearities that, in our model economy,
are key in determining the equilibrium allocation of risk.
4.1 Solution Method
We adopt a perturbation method in alternative to global methods, used by other con-
tributions in the literature—see e.g., the related paper by Coeurdacier et al. (2019).
There are two reasons for our choice. First, perturbation methods naturally yield a
decomposition of the solution in the various higher moments of the data generating
process. This allows us to relate our solution to variance, kurtosis and skewness in the
distribution of fundamentals in a clean way. Second, as already mentioned, a novel
contribution of our paper consists of showing how to address the problem of solving for
the initial distribution of wealth under complete markets, using perturbation methods
at any order of approximation.
Following Lombardo and Uhlig (2018), we represent all the variables in our
model as functions of the loading parameter for the exogenous stochastic process (ω),
e.g. Ct = C(t;ω). We then take higher order series expansions of the model with
respect to ω around the risk-less equilibrium (ω = 0). The resulting system of stochas-
tic difference equations is recursively linear. Standard solution methods can then be
applied recursively to solve for the rational-expectation equilibrium.
As customary in the literature, we begin by observing that the risk-sharing
condition (3.16) can be solved backward to yield:
log ζt − log ζ∗t + logQt = log ζ0 − log ζ∗0 + logQ0 := ρ log κ. (4.1)
where the subscript 0 indicates the time in which the risk-sharing agreement is decided
and implemented for the first time. The time-invariant variable κ is the risk-sharing
“constant”, ubiquitous in the open-macroeconomics literature under complete markets
14See e.g. Holmes (1995), Judd (1998), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), Lombardo and Sutherland
(2007), Kim et al. (2008), Andreasen et al. (2018), and Lombardo and Uhlig (2018).
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(e.g. Chari et al., 2002).15 This constant reflects the endogenous initial distribution of
wealth under complete markets, which, as we work out in the rest of the paper, is a
function of equilibrium assets and goods prices, as well as of the quantities produced.
The initial distribution of wealth under a full set of period-by-period state
contingent (Arrow) securities is pinned down by a condition on the initial distribution
of Arrow securities across borders. Usually this is set equal to zero, de facto imposing
that the risk-sharing agreement is first started from a position of zero net foreign assets,
see (see, e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012, Ch 8)). This implies that solving forward




Λt|0 (Ct − pH,tYt) = 0. (4.2)
Upon adding the initial condition constraint (4.2) to the system of equations
representing our model, we can solve for all the endogenous variables of the model,
including κ. In general this requires solving for a fixed-point. Below we show how to
approach the problem using perturbation methods.
Take the m− order series-expansion of κ around ω = 0








. At each order m, solve for κ(m) and proceed recursively,
starting from κ(0) = κ̄ and κ(1) = 0 (as certainty equivalence holds at first order). By
way of example, a second order expansion implies that
κ̃ := log κ(ω)− log κ(0) ≈ 1
2
κ(2) (4.4)
where wlog we set ω = 1.16
Our solution algorithm (whether applied analytically or numerically) proceeds
as follows
1. Expand to the order of interest the system of equations constituting the model;
15For non-separable preferences or recursive preferences, e.g. à la Bansal and Yaron (2004), a
similar decomposition can be obtained. Details can be obtained from the authors on request.
16The accuracy of the approximation clearly depends on the size of ω. Nevertheless, we can
normalize this to 1 and scale appropriately the standard deviation of the underlying shocks, wlog.
17
2. Find the RE solution for all variables as a function of κ̃;
3. Use the appropriate series expansion of condition (4.2) to solve for κ̃.
For higher orders of approximation this algorithm can be used recursively starting from
lower orders to build the solution for higher orders, i.e. to construct a solution for each
of the variables of the model with the same structure as in equation (4.3).
In Appendix A, we detail an additional step which is particularly useful for
numerical solutions of DSGE models of any size, e.g. using Dynare (Juillard, 1996).
4.2 Economic Structure and the Transmission of Output Risk
In economic models, higher order moments (in the stochastic processes of productivity)
would matter for risk sharing, even if the economy could be reduced to a system of
log-linear equation—this is because the welfare function itself is typically not loglinear.
In general, however, higher moments can and do play a key role in determining the
equilibrium prices and allocation via different mechanisms. It is instructive to map and
briefly review the non-loglinearities in our model, to gain insight on which part of the
economy actively shapes the transmission of asymmetric risk. Throughout this section,
to ease exposition, we assume that the TFP process has no common component across
countries, i.e., ι = ι∗ = 1.
To start with, we note that the only equations in our model that are loglinear
for any parameter values are the labor supply equations and the production function.
In particular, we take the ratio of Home and Foreign labor supply (equation 3.15b
and Foreign counterpart), using the production function (equation 3.1 and Foreign
counterpart). Denoting the terms of trade as τt :=
pF,t
pH,t
, we obtain an expression
linking relative consumption to a weighted geometric average of relative output, relative


















where j = 1 with CRRA preferences and j = 0 with GHH preferences.
All other equations are generally non-loglinear, although some become loglin-
ear in special cases. We organize our discussion distinguishing between non-loglinearities
that are/are not independent of the international financial arrangements. The first
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(common to financial autarky and complete markets) arise from the demand aggre-
gators ((3.13) and (3.14)) and the price aggregators ((3.11) and (3.12)). The second
pertain to the financial structure, and are thus embedded in the budget constraints
(3.6).
4.2.1 Non-loglinearities in Price Indexes and Production Functions
Among the loglinearities that are independent of the financial regime, a first one arises
from the price indexes (equations 3.11 and 3.12). In general, taking the ratio of equa-
tions (3.11) and (3.12) gives a nonlinear relation between the real exchange rate and
terms of trade:
Qθ−1t =
ντ θ−1 + 1− ν
ν∗τ θ−1 + 1− ν∗
(4.6)
Focusing on equal-size economies, a fourth order approximation of equation (4.6) (n =
1
2
) can be written as:
Q̃t = (1− λ)τ̃t −
1
6






This shows that, for equal-size economies, up to fourth order of approximation the
relationship between the mean log of the real exchange rate and the mean log of the
terms of trade is affected by the skewness, but not by the kurtosis, of the terms of
trade. For economies of unequal size, also the variance and kurtosis of terms of trade
come into play. One may nonetheless note that the expressions above become loglinear
(only) when θ = 1, that is, under Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator, and when
λ = 1, that is, under Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).17
















which becomes exactly loglinear in the special case of PPP—in which case relative
output is proportional to the terms of trade. In the general case (failing PPP), a fourth
order approximation of equation (4.8) (again) for the case of equal-size economies,





= θτ̃t + X̃t, (4.9)
where








r̃t + Q̃t(θ − 1)
)3
(4.10)
and where r̃t is relative consumption expressed in equivalent units, that is,
r̃t = C̃
∗
t − C̃t + Q̃t. (4.11)
Up to fourth order of approximation, for equal-size economies, the relationship
between the mean log of relative output and terms of trade is affected only by the mean
and skewness of log relative consumption adjusted for the real exchange rate. Variance
and kurtosis come into play if the economies differ in size.
The set of equations considered so far characterizes the solution for relative
prices and cross-country ratios—the real exchange rate and the terms of trade (equation
4.6) as well as relative aggregate demand (equation 4.8). When solving for the level
of variables, further non-loglinearities arise from equation (3.13) (or 3.14), even under
θ = 1 and PPP.
4.2.2 Non-loglinearities in the Budget Constraint
The non-loglinearity that is arguably most consequential for welfare and allocation,
however, is the one arising from alternative specifications of financial markets—specifically,
from the budget constraint (3.6). To fully appreciate this point, note that under au-
tarky, the ratio of home and foreign household’s budget constraints implies that relative









This expression is loglinear, meaning that it will not come into play in the way order
moments of the distribution will contribute to allocations. This is in sharp contrast
to the case of complete markets, in which case the budget constraint (3.6) cannot be
reduced to a simple loglinear equation. As discussed in detail below, this difference is
crucial in understanding how risk-sharing, or lack thereof, impinges on allocations.
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It should be stressed that failing to account for the budget constraint causes
models to yield a number of puzzling results (i.e., welfare being higher in autarky than
under complete markets) that become apparent in the presence of significant hetero-
geneity across regions and countries. Our analysis thus warns against the common
practice of writing quantitative models under complete markets omitting the budget
constraint.
5 Asset Prices, Terms of Trade and Consumption
Under complete markets, because of the non-linearities arising from the budget con-
straint, risk drives relative wealth and consumption by impinging on assets and goods
prices. In this section, we provide analytical insight on the transmission mechanism.
We start by showing how higher (co-)moments affect asset prices. Imposing
the transversality condition limi→∞ Λt+i|tPK,t+i = 0, the price of domestic productive





where this price is increasing in the comovement between the SDF and the net return.
Then, by taking the fourth-order series expansion of this expression around D̄ = D̄∗ = 1
and Λ̄ = δ = R̄−1k = R̄
∗−1








ṙK,t+i + Λ̇t+i|t + PH,t+i
]
. (5.2)










18 In line with this, we can express the

























18We collect these terms together as the higher orders are due to the log-expansion and not to
intrinsic non-loglinearities of the model.
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This premium characterizes the “riskiness” of the asset, depending on how its return
comoves with its valuation (the SDF)—PH,t+i is indeed related to the “beta” measure
of risk discussed in the financial literature (e.g. Cochrane, 2009). The “beta” mea-
sure depends on the covariance between the SDF and the gross return on the risky
asset: our premium spells out how the riskiness of an asset depends on the various
co-moments between the SDF and its net return. Specifically, the first line of equation
(5.3) corresponds to the second-order premium and involves the “covariance” between
the SDF and the net return. The second line corresponds to the third-order premium
and involves the “coskewness” between these variables. The third line corresponds to
the fourth-order premium and involves the “cokurtosis” of the same variables.19
Asymmetries in risk and size affect asset prices, average terms of trade (reflect-
ing relative demand and supply of national outputs), average real exchange rates and
average consumption (reflecting relative wealth). The equilibrium link between these
variable is complex, but becomes tractable in some special cases, e.g., under symmet-
ric preferences, implying PPP, or log utility in consumption. To build intuition, the
following proposition states a useful didactic result under PPP.20
Proposition 1. Under complete markets and power utility in consumption, holding
PPP, relative consumption is equal to the relative value of a country’s current and









Proof. With complete markets and power utility in consumption, it is easy to see that,


















where µ is the share of the value of Home output in world output, current and future,
the latter expressed in Home consumption units: Yw,t := npH,tYt + (1 − n)pF,tY ∗t ,
whereas we have used equation (5.1) to express the numerator in terms of asset prices
19It may be noted that these are not central moments. We use this terminology for simplicity and
directness.
20The proposition generalizes the result in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) assuming one world homo-
geneous good.
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and current (time 0) income (equivalent current output evaluated at its time 0 good
price).21 A similar expression (as (5.5)) characterizes the Foreign country, making use
of the fact that C∗t =
1− nµ
1− n
Yw,t. (5.4), directly follows taking the ratio of equation
(5.5) and its foreign counterpart.
The proposition establishes that, under PPP, relative consumption moves with
relative financial wealth, reflecting the relative valuation of country-specific assets—
which are claims to the income generated by the domestic (current ad future) produc-
tion of national goods valued at their equilibrium prices (terms of trade). Note that,
from equation (4.8), we also know that the output stream will be endogenous, since in
equilibrium prices and wealth differences will impinge on relative labor supply across
border.
Relaxing PPP, a closed form solution for κ can only be derived for the special
case of log utility, ρ = 1. In general, the exchange rate will drive an optimal wedge
between marginal utility across borders. The risk-sharing condition (4.1) together with








Yw,t = µQ,tYw,t (5.6)
The share of a country consumption in global output depends not only on κ, but also






















This expression calls attention to the fact that, when capital market integra-
tion moves the economy from financial autarky to perfect risk sharing, repricing of
goods and assets can be expected to result in significant changes in relative wealth,
21This equivalence follows in the version of the model holding the aggregate capital stock fixed.
More in general the numerator of equation (5.5) would be related to the price of a claim to the Home
country income. The denominator would be the price of a claim to global income.
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impinging on relative consumption and labor supply. In the next sections we will artic-
ulate this point, resorting to higher-order perturbation methods to fully characterize
the model solution in terms of higher moments.
6 The Relative Gains from Risk Sharing (RGRS):
a decomposition into smoothing and level effects
Having described how higher moments drive the valuation effects of capital market
integration, in this section we focus on how these effects concur to determine the
relative welfare gains across countries. One question often asked in the literature is
whether “riskier” countries gain more from integrating their financial markets with
safer ones. This question provides a good angle to analyze which specific moments
and structural parameters determine the relative riskiness of a country, and drive its
relative gains from risk sharing.
We start by defining the relative gains from perfect risk sharing, RGRS, in


















where Ût = Ut − Ū , cm denotes complete markets and au denotes autarky.
The RGRS can be decomposed into a “level effect” (LE) and a “smoothing
effect” (SE) of moving from autarky to complete markets. These effects are defined as
follows:
Definition 3 (Level and level effect). LE corresponds to the linear term of the 4th


















SE summarizes all higher moments of the 4th order approximation of RGRS:
SE := RGRS − LE.
For the sake of analytical tractability, we will focus on two equal-size countries
(n = 0.5) with identical preferences, so that PPP holds. We will show that our main
conclusions go through also when PPP doesn’t hold.
Recall that, under the simplifying assumptions of PPP, mean-preserving dis-
tributions and symmetry of initial steady state endowments, mean consumption under
autarky is identical across countries. Therefore, LE is simply the difference between
home and foreign consumption levels under complete markets.
We now state two propositions that establish, for equal-size countries under
PPP (a) a simple mapping of RGRS into asset prices under complete markets and
autarky, and (b) how the overall RGRS are driven by asymmetries in the distribution
of output.
Proposition 2 (RGRS and asset prices). Assume that: aggregate capital is fixed (and
normalized to 1); α = 1 ; Ȳ = Ȳ ∗; consumption preferences are identical across









Û cmt − Û∗ cmt
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Proof. The proof follows from direct calculation.
Remarkably, for equal-size countries under PPP, our measure of relative risk
RR is also a measure of the relative welfare under complete markets. Safer countries
invariably gain more from perfect risk sharing. Relative risk translates partly into
asymmetries in consumption levels, partly into asymmetries in the volatility and thick-
ness of the tails of the distribution of consumption. While we will analyse how these
two effects shape the gains below, we can anticipate here that the relative gains to the
safer country accrue mostly in terms of average consumption.
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The second part of the proposition shows that an analogous condition holds
under autarky. Barring trade in assets, relative welfare is proportional to relative
asset prices. Since under our assumptions the level component of consumption is
identical under autarky, the difference in asset prices reflects exclusively the volatility
and thickness of the distribution of consumption. Not surprisingly, in this case safer
countries have higher welfare than riskier countries because residents enjoy a smoother
consumption.
The following proposition shows how RGRS depends on different moments of
the TFP distribution, under the same assumptions as for the previous propositions.
Proposition 3 (Distribution of Gains). Assume that: aggregate capital is fixed (and
normalized to 1); α = 1 ; Ȳ = Ȳ ∗; consumption preferences are identical across
countries (λ = 1 and PPP holds) and that countries have equal size (n = 1
2
). Then,




∂ (γ − γ∗)2
)










∂ (η − η∗)
)
= sign ((θ − 1) (ρ− 1) (ι− (1− ι∗))) . (6.1c)
Proof. Propositions 2 and 3 are proved by direct calculation of the solution of the
model. In particular, solving the model to fourth-order of accuracy under the assump-
tions of Proposition 3 yields
RGRS =− δ(θ − 1)
3ρ(ρ+ 1) (ι− (1− ι∗))3
96(1− δ)θ3
×{
3 (ι− ι∗) (ρ− 1)Γ2
(
(γ − γ∗)2 − 1
)
+4 (φ− φ∗)− 2 (ρ− 1) ((η − η∗) + (ι− ι∗)N)} (6.2)
where N := η + η∗.
We start by noting a remarkable “equal-gain” result established by the propo-
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sition. As long as ι = ι∗, the first equation in Proposition 6.1 simplifies to(
∂RGRS
∂ (γ − γ∗)2
)
= 0
The benefits from risk sharing are always symmetric for countries with symmetric size,
preferences and technology, but differing in the volatility of their output.22 The rele-
vance of this result lies in the fact that, if only for a special case, it clearly illustrates
the interplay of the level and smoothing channels in determining the RGRS. Specifi-
cally, up to a fourth order of approximation, differences in the volatility of output do
not impinge at all on the relative welfare gains from complete markets relative to au-
tarky: the welfare improvement is independent of the relative riskiness of the national
income process. It follows that, varying relative output volatility, any gains in terms
of consumption smoothing are exactly offset by losses in average consumption (and
vice-versa).
The equal gains result above provides a useful benchmark against which to
assess the general case away from symmetry. Henceforth, for clarity of exposition, we
assume that ι > 1− ι∗, that is, each country has a higher intensity in one technology.
When the stochastic properties of the two technologies differ, the result differ depending
on ρ and θ. Provided that ρ > 1 and θ > 1, the gains from risk sharing are larger
for the country whose production has a relatively stronger bias in ‘own’ technology,
proportionately to the square of the aggregate variance Γ. This effect is partially
compensated by the square of relative variances. Note that, since γ ∈ (0, 1), then
(γ − γ∗)2 ≤ 1, so that this compensation is typically only partial.
For θ > 1, when countries differ in terms of the frequency of very negative or
positive realization of TFP (skewness), the country whose income is more exposed to
negative events will tend to benefit more from risk sharing. Because of the benefit of
insuring (low-probability but) large realizations of income, the gains in consumption
smoothing exceed the equilibrium losses in terms of the level effect. By the same
token, the country whose income distribution is characterized by fatter tails (excess
kurtosis) and thus prone to extreme events will tend to benefit more from risk sharing,
unless consumption preferences are sub-logarithmic. Note that, for aggregate kurtosis
(N) there is a further effect on the RGRS: the country with a relatively stronger
technological ‘bias’ will gain relatively more, the larger aggregate kurtosis is.
Proposition 3 highlights that the gains from risk sharing cannot be correctly
22RGRS are also zero, trivially, when technologies are identical, i.e. ι = 1− ι∗. In this case, shocks
are global and there are no gains from risk sharing.
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understood without a comprehensive analysis of the different channels through which
they materialize. The gains accruing from relative consumption levels are usually in-
versely related to the gains accruing from smoothing. Which channel prevails, smooth-
ing vs level, varies with the distribution of the shock, and structural parameters of the
economy.
The proposition also establishes the way higher skewness impinges on the
relative gains from risk sharing depends exclusively on θ, a parameter that also matters
at the fourth order. Conversely, ρ (together with θ) drives the relative gains from risk
sharing only at even orders. Below we expand on the analysis of the different role of
the (static) elasticity of substitution θ between goods and risk aversion ρ in shaping
tail risk sharing at different orders of accuracy.
6.1 Trade Elasticity
The key to understand the role of θ is that higher relative output volatility, skewness
and kurtosis do not mechanically translate into higher income volatility, skewness and
kurtosis—the mapping depends on the equilibrium response of relative good prices to
output shock. This in turn depends on the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods, θ.
This point is best appreciated in light of the literature pioneered by Cole and
Obstfeld (1991), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Corsetti et al. (2008). In their well
known contribution, Cole and Obstfeld (1991) show that in the limiting case of a unit
elasticity of substitution, relative prices and relative output move opposite to each
other in the same proportion—hence output fluctuations cannot cause any variation in




= τ θ−1. (6.3)
If θ = 1 non-financial income is always identical across countries, independently of
shocks to the supply of output. Indeed, under autarky, per equation (4.12) and using













With θ = 1, consumption is equalized across countries. Introducing complete markets
in this environment would be irrelevant because domestic income and wealth are al-
ready perfectly correlated across countries. Relative price adjustment makes contingent
transfers (providing insurance) redundant: relative welfare is identical across countries
whether or not markets are complete. In light of our definition 1, risk is also identical,
independently of the different stochastic properties of the TFP processes.
Conversely, a θ above or below 1 affects how the relative moments of output
translate into the relative moments of income via the equilibrium adjustment in the
relative price of goods. Intuitively, an elasticity above unity implies that prices still
move opposite relative to a country output, but less than proportionally relative to
quantities. Hence, higher output volatility translates into higher income volatility.
On the contrary, with an elasticity below 1, prices move more than proportionally
to any change in relative output. With perfect insurance, higher quantity volatility
translates into lower income volatility.23 In general equilibrium in turn, the relative
price adjustment will affect relative wealth, the ratio of the present discounted value
of income, and therefore the relative adjustment in the relative risk (Definition 1).
6.2 Risk Aversion
In our Proposition 3 above, risk aversion plays a role in determining the RGRS from
asymmetries in variance and kurtosis, but not from asymmetries in skewness. To gain
insight into this result, and more in general on how risk aversion influences the different
channels through which countries benefit from mutual insurance of macroeconomic risk,
it is instructive to focus on the case θ →∞, so that home and foreign goods are perfect
substitutes and there is no adjustment in the relative price of goods.
With a homogeneous good, replacing the net return on domestic capital with









nYt+i + (1− n)Y ∗t+i
nYt + (1− n)Y ∗t
)−ρ
Yt+i (6.5)
where the expression in parenthesis in the discount factor is the growth rate of world
consumption. An analogous expression holds for the foreign economy.
23With home bias in consumption, the response of the terms of trade to a given output shock is not
necessarily monotonic, see Corsetti et al. (2008) for a detailed analysis. This observation is relevant
in numerical analysis for elasticity of substitution below 1/2.
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Now, in the limiting case of ρ = 1 (utility from consumption is logarithmic) the
log-expansion of the utility function has no higher order terms, that is, U(Ct) = log(Ct)
to any order of accuracy. Hence, under our assumptions (equal-size countries producing
a homogeneous good normalized such that Ȳ = Ȳ ∗ = 1), expected utility in autarky
is identical for the two countries, EU(Caut ) = EU(C
∗,au
t ). By proposition 2, then,
the difference in utility under complete markets coincides with RR. In other words,
it only depends on changes in asset prices. It follows that, moving from autarky to
perfect insurance has no smoothing effect. Relative gains from risk sharing are driven
exclusively by asset valuation.


























Our key result for the limiting case of log preferences in our structurally symmetric
economy follows from taking a log expansion of order m of the ratio on the right-hand
















Relative asset prices are affected only by odd moments of the distribution of relative
income xt: only differences in the degree of asymmetry of the distributions matter
for asset price revaluation and hence welfare under log preferences. Gains from risk
sharing would be missed by focusing only on second moments.
This main conclusion is strengthened when we move away from the log-
preference case. Specifically, it can be shown that the even derivatives of (6.5) (evalu-
ated at the symmetric deterministic steady state) are multiplied by the term (1 − ρ),
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while the odd derivatives – those capturing the asymmetries in the distribution – are
not. Even moments (e.g., variance or kurtosis) have an extra, direct effect on relative
asset prices and welfare as long as ρ 6= 1—and will thus affect the RGRS.
Comparing two countries with asymmetric kurtosis in the distribution of out-
put, higher values of ρ amplify the range of variation in the discount factor, making
the country with relatively fatter tail relatively riskier. Thus, the difference in asset
prices will be increasing in ρ. It is worth reiterating that all these results would go
unnoticed if we restricted our attention to Gaussian stochastic processes, widely used
in the literature, as the odd moments of Gaussian distributions are always zero. That
said, we also note that the above results are derived under the Assumption 1, which
implies independence of the two income processes.
7 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we reconsider and generalize our main results using quantitative anal-
ysis. In particular we allow for endogenous labor and cross-country differences in pref-
erences over consumption goods (home bias). In a richer specification of the model, we
can assess the (SE and LE) components of relative welfare gains and the macroeconomic
effects of risk sharing, as function of key structural parameters.
In addition to expanding on the consumption smoothing and relative wealth
channels highlighted in the previous section, our quantitative analysis will highlight a
novel one. Gains from risk sharing may also materialize via a terms of trade channel—
reflecting any adjustment in relative labor supply and demand for home and foreign
goods across borders. A country that experiences an improvement in its terms of trade
can enjoy a higher consumption-to-labor ratio for any given asset price revaluation.
To bring forward the implications of risk sharing for the terms of trade, we assess the
model for different degrees of home bias, as this is the key parameter determining the
terms-of-trade effect, and contrast standard CRRA preferences with GHH preferences,
since the latter rule out wealth effect on labor supply.
In our exercises we will restrict attention to specific values for the trade elas-
ticity (θ = 1.5) and risk aversion (ρ = 4), bearing in mind their role in determining
our results as explained above.24
24We chose a relatively high value for risk aversion following Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2016)
in a related analysis.
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7.1 Parametrization
We set the frequency of the model to annual (reflecting the frequency of our main PWT
database). The share of labor in production is 1−α = 0.7, the risk aversion parameter
is ρ = 4, the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply is ϕ = 1.75 (see Attanasio
et al., 2018), the weight of disutility from working is normalized to χ = 20,25 and the
trade elasticity of substitution is θ = 1.5,26 and the discount factor is δ = (1 + 0.02)
implying a real rate of 2% per year. We assume that the persistence of the TFP process
is ϕD = 0.7, amounting to the average TFP across OECD countries. We assume that
ι = ι∗ = 1.
The baseline moments are set at the median value shown in Table 1. In
particular, denoting the 5-th percentile by x and the 95-th by y, for each moment, we
set the total variance (Γ := γ + γ∗), total skewness (Φ := φ + φ∗) and total kurtosis
(N := η + η∗) at the value corresponding to x+ y (see Table 1 for the specific values).
Then we set the range of values for γ, φ and η at {50%, 60%, 70%, y
j
} where j =
{Γ,Φ, N} respectively. We present our analysis at first focusing on GHH preferences,
which allow us to purge out the terms-of-trade effect stemming from income effects on
labor supply. We then discuss our baseline with CRRA preferences, using the Appendix
to elaborate on the comparison of the two cases.
7.2 Relative Gains from Risk Sharing by Channels and Mo-
ments
The results from our quantitative exercises are shown in Tables 2 through 5 in the
text and in Appendix C. To enhance comparison across tables, we report the RGRS
as share of the global gains from risk sharing, i.e. the sum of Home and Foreign gains:
we denote this share by RGRSs. Correspondingly, we scale the LE and SE by total
welfare gains, with notation LEs and SEs respectively.
All our tables include five panels. The first three panels report, respectively,
RGRSs, and its decomposition into the two additive terms SEs and LEs. The last
two panels show the relative adjustment in asset prices and terms of trade. In each
25This value yields approximately hours worked equal to 20% of total time, in line with US data.
That said, the value of χ does not affect the results.
26Consistently with our discussion of Proposition 3, the sign of RGRS (and the direction of the
channels) change around θ = 1. For reasons of space, we show results only for θ > 1, as this is the
typical range considered in the literature.
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panel, rows describe the results for four degrees of home bias (1 − λ), in decreasing
order (1=no home bias). Columns show results for different values of each moment, in
the ranges defined above.
Results assuming GHH preferences are shown in Tables 2 through 4. Focusing
on asymmetric variances first, the results shown in table 2 confirms and generalizes our
analytical results. The country with the most volatile output gains more. In relative
terms, however, the gains from improved smoothing(the level effect shown in the second
panel of the table) are to a large extent offset by a negative level effect (LE, in the
third panel). The opposite is true for the country with a lower volatility of output.
This country gains mainly in terms of average utility from consumption and leisure. In
the limiting case of no-home-bias (λ = 1, corresponding to PPP), the SE and LE offset
each other exactly. This generalizes Proposition 3, stated for endowment economies,
to a production economy under GHH preferences.
The drivers of the level effect are shown in the bottom part of the Table 2.
Observe that both the relative price of assets and the relative price of goods (terms
of trade) deteriorate for the country with the more volatile output—improve for the
other country. Indeed, the country with a low output volatility enjoys higher relative
wealth and purchasing power. Note that, with GHH preferences, the terms of trade
adjust only with home bias in consumption. This is because, with home bias, changes
in relative income and wealth modify the composition of global demand in favor of the
output produced by the safer (and thus richer) country—driving up its relative price.
With GHH preferences, when λ approaches 1–the case of PPP–the terms of trade do
not move at all.
Comparing the results in three tables Tables 2 through 4, it is apparent that
tail risk magnifies the RGRS among heterogeneous countries. To appreciate this point,
in each table, consider a “risky” (Home) country in the upper decile of the distribution
of the corresponding moment, for the intermediate degree of home bias (.75). Relative
to the median (Foreign) country, the risky Home country only gains 0.4 percentage
points (of total gains) more than the Foreign country, if it falls in the upper decile
of the variance distribution (Table 2, first panel). However, it gains 8.7 percentage
points more if it falls in the upper decile of the (negative) skewness distribution (Table
3, first panel); and 8.8 percentage points more if it falls in the upper decile of the
kurtosis distribution (Table 4, first panel). With tail risk, the relative gains for the
riskier country are 20 times larger (8.7 or 8.8 versus 0.4).
In the three tables, the SE and the LE have opposite sign, but the relative
weight of these two components is different. In the Tables for skewness and kurtosis
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(Tables 3 and 4), the SE for the risky country (i.e., a country whose output distribution
has the fatter tail, or the larger mass on negative realization), is much larger relative
to the LE. Insuring against extreme realizations of output yields large gains in terms of
consumption smoothing. The level effect (the macroeconomic “price” of the insurance),
while non negligible, plays a smaller role compared to the case of asymmetric variances
in Table 2.
A notable result is that, everything else equal, the riskier country gains more
(the RGRS are higher) when home bias is high. This result is only in part explained
by the SE component of the RGRS. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, what matters is that,
when home bias is high, the risky country actually suffers smaller losses in terms of
LE (LE is less negative in the third panel of the tables). This is so, despite the fact
that the fall in asset prices is more pronounced (fourth panel). But while a large fall
in asset prices makes the risky country relatively worse-off in financial terms, the loss
in real purchasing power of their residents remains contained because of a moderate
deterioration in their terms of trade (fifth panel).
As is well known, GHH preferences insulate labor supply from wealth effects–
for more general preferences, these wealth effects activate an additional mechanism by
which risk sharing may cause terms of trade adjustment. If only for this reason, it is
particularly instructive to consider the case of CRRA preferences. To save space, we
only discuss results for the variance in the main text (Table 5) – we present the results
for the other moments in the Appendix C.
With CRRA preferences, when moving from autarky to perfect risk sharing
(κ), the safer country consumes more and works less on average. This implies that,
through the effects of market integration, the terms of trade tend to improve for the
safer country. The gains in purchasing power may be strong enough to tilt the RGRSs
in its favor under PPP and for an intermediate degree of home bias. Yet home bias
interacts with risk. A strong degree of home bias tilts the RGRSs back in favor of the
riskier country, in line with the results using GHH preferences. Note that, in Table 5,
the RGRSs changes sign between the first and the second row. The nonlinear effects
of labor supply and terms of trade adjustment under CRRA preferences mitigate and
can even reverse the RGRSs for riskier countries.
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Table 2: Welfare and Relative Price Effects of Risk Sharing by Volatility of TFP, GHH
preferences
γ†
Home-Bias 50% 60% 70% 95%
RGRSs††
0.2 0.0000 0.4311 0.8665 2.1008
0.75 0.0000 0.0824 0.1655 0.4005
1. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
SEs††
0.2 0.0000 1.1634 2.3387 5.6798
0.75 0.0000 1.5242 3.0626 7.4155
1. 0.0000 2.3436 4.7085 11.3920
LEs††
0.2 0.0000 −0.7322 −1.4722 −3.5790
0.75 0.0000 −1.4418 −2.8970 −7.0150
1. 0.0000 −2.3436 −4.7085 −11.3920
Relative Gains in Asset Prices
0.2 0.0000 −1.1350 −2.2700 −5.3422
0.75 0.0000 −0.3353 −0.6706 −1.5781
1. 0.0000 −0.1983 −0.3965 −0.9332
Home Average Terms of Trade
0.2 0.0000 0.8172 1.6345 3.8465
0.75 0.0000 0.0631 0.1262 0.2970
1. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
All measures are in percentages. n = 1
2
, θ = 1.5,ρ = 4, φ = φ∗ = 50%, η = η∗ = 50%.
Fourth-order approximation.
† Columns refer to the distribution displayed in Table 1
†† Permanent consumption equivalent (pce) units relative to total welfare in pce units.
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Table 3: Home bias in consumption and home relative skewness of TFP - GHH pref-
erences
φ†
Home-Bias 50% 60% 70% 95%
RGRSs††
0.2 0.0000 0.8312 1.6624 10.1457
0.75 0.0000 0.7160 1.4320 8.7421
1. 0.0000 0.5380 1.0761 6.5698
SEs††
0.2 0.0000 0.9693 1.9386 11.8312
0.75 0.0000 0.9424 1.8848 11.5060
1. 0.0000 0.9040 1.8080 11.0381
LEs††
0.2 0.0000 −0.1381 −0.2762 −1.6855
0.75 0.0000 −0.2264 −0.4527 −2.7638
1. 0.0000 −0.3659 −0.7319 −4.4682
Relative Gains in Asset Prices
0.2 0.0000 −0.2697 −0.5394 −3.2931
0.75 0.0000 −0.0734 −0.1468 −0.8965
1. 0.0000 −0.0424 −0.0848 −0.5175
Home Average Terms of Trade
0.2 0.0000 0.1720 0.3441 2.1007
0.75 0.0000 0.0101 0.0203 0.1237
1. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
All measures are in percentages. n = 1
2
, θ = 1.5, ρ = 4, γ = 50%, φ∗ = 1 − φ, η = η∗ = 50%.
Fourth-order approximation.
† Columns refer to the distribution displayed in Table 1
†† Permanent consumption equivalent (pce) units relative to total welfare in pce units.
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Table 4: Home bias in consumption and home relative kurtosis of TFP - GHH prefer-
ences
η†
Home-Bias 50% 60% 70% 95%
RGRSs††
0.2 0.0000 3.0267 6.0527 10.2219
0.75 0.0000 2.6073 5.2144 8.8078
1. 0.0000 1.9592 3.9184 6.6192
SEs††
0.2 0.0000 3.2188 6.4368 10.8706
0.75 0.0000 2.8238 5.6474 9.5392
1. 0.0000 2.3098 4.6195 7.8035
LEs††
0.2 0.0000 −0.1921 −0.3841 −0.6487
0.75 0.0000 −0.2165 −0.4330 −0.7314
1. 0.0000 −0.3505 −0.7011 −1.1843
Relative Gains in Asset Prices
0.2 0.0000 −0.4376 −0.8751 −1.4784
0.75 0.0000 −0.1071 −0.2141 −0.3618
1. 0.0000 −0.0570 −0.1139 −0.1925
Home Average Terms of Trade
0.2 0.0000 0.2185 0.4369 0.7381
0.75 0.0000 0.0095 0.0190 0.0321
1. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
All measures are in percentages. n = 1
2
, θ = 1.5, ρ = 4, γ = 50%, φ = φ∗ = 50%, η∗ = 1 − η.
Fourth-order approximation.
† Columns refer to the distribution displayed in Table 1
†† Permanent consumption equivalent (pce) units relative to total welfare in pce units.
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Table 5: Home bias in consumption and home relative volatility of TFP - CRRA
preferences
γ†
Home-Bias 50% 60% 70% 95%
RGRSs††
0.2 0.0000 0.0959 0.1922 0.4566
0.75 0.0000 −0.0289 −0.0580 −0.1374
1. 0.0000 −0.0545 −0.1090 −0.2584
SEs††
0.2 0.0000 1.2578 2.5197 5.9872
0.75 0.0000 1.5613 3.1265 7.4146
1. 0.0000 2.0900 4.1849 9.9189
LEs††
0.2 0.0000 −1.1619 −2.3275 −5.5306
0.75 0.0000 −1.5902 −3.1844 −7.5520
1. 0.0000 −2.1444 −4.2939 −10.1773
Relative Gains in Asset Prices
0.2 0.0000 −0.4028 −0.8056 −1.8959
0.75 0.0000 −0.1370 −0.2740 −0.6449
1. 0.0000 −0.0822 −0.1645 −0.3871
Home Average Terms of Trade
0.2 0.0000 0.3983 0.7965 1.8745
0.75 0.0000 0.1347 0.2694 0.6339
1. 0.0000 0.0818 0.1636 0.3851
All measures are in percentages. n = 1
2
, θ = 1.5, ρ = 4, φ = φ∗ = 50%, η = η∗ = 50%.
Fourth-order approximation.
† Columns refer to the distribution displayed in Table 1
†† Permanent consumption equivalent (pce) units relative to total welfare in pce units.
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Asset Prices -1.843 1.916
Terms of Trade -0.291 0.317
Note: For the methodology, see the note to Fig-
ure 3.
7.3 Model Simulations
So far we have carried out our analysis focusing on each higher moment in the distribu-
tion of GDP by country separately. In this section, we will use the empirical evidence
in Section 2 (see also Table 9), to assess the potential gains from risk sharing treating
the different moments jointly. In doing so, we will be in a good position to capture the
full extent of asymmetries in the distribution of GDP across borders.
We conduct our exercise by randomly drawing 1449 non-repeated pairs of
countries from Table 9, each draw generating a pair of vectors of moments for Home
and Foreign. The results are shown in Figure 3 and Table 6. Starting from Figure 3,
in panel (a) we plot the distribution of the Relative Gains from Risk Sharing RGRSs
predicted by our model. The following panels refer the decomposition of RGRSs into
smoothing effect SEs (panel (b)), and level effect LEs (panel (c)), as well as to the
distribution of the relative change in asset prices (panel (d)) and in the Home terms
of trade (panel (e)), all relative to autarky. The summary of these results in Table 6
reports also the 90% interval of each distribution.27
Our new figure highlights at least three remarkable results. To start with,
as shown in panel (a), many country pairs gain about the same from risk sharing
(corresponding to the mass around zero). Yet, there is a dense tail of countries that
draw significantly larger or lower relative gains (right and left tail of distribution).
Considering the 90% interval of the distribution, the relative gains/losses from risk
27A comment is in order about taking country pairs as our unit of observation, as opposed to,
say, pairing a country with regions obtained from aggregating countries. Aggregating countries into
regions would be more directly representative of the gains that one individual country could obtain
from joining a larger integrated capital market (or aggregate risk sharing institutional arrangement).
However, aggregation would also implicitly internalize some of the potential gains from risk sharing,
as these would already be achieved through within-region diversification. We find our approach closer
in line with the goal of bringing our evidence to bear on the potential gains from, and effects of,
aggregate GDP risk sharing.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Risk Sharing Effects
(a) RGRSs
(b) SEs (c) LEs
(d) Relative Gains in Asset Prices (e) Home change in Average Terms of Trade
Note: The frequency distributions shown in each panel are derived by randomly drawing 1449 non-repeated pairs of
countries using the estimated moments displayed in Table 9 for our sample. Specifically, for each pair of country, we
assign moments to a Home and a Foreign country (eliminating repetition), and compute the measures on the x-axis of
each panel. Total moments (i.e. Γ, Φ and N) change through draws (country pairs). In the simulations we assume that
λ = 0.75, i.e. a considerable degree of trade openness.
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sharing (as a percentage of the total gains) are of the order of 10 percentage points on
either side.
In light of our analysis, relatively riskier countries tend be the winner in terms
of improved smoothing, reflecting heterogeneity in exposure to tail risk. The decom-
position of RGRSs into smoothing and level effects, in panels (b) and (c), corroborates
this analytical insight. A significant group of riskier countries mostly gains in terms
of improved smoothing, in excess of the loss from a lower average level of wealth and
consumption. A significant group of safer countries mostly gains in terms of relative
wealth and consumption–these gains more than offsetting the relative loss in smooth-
ing. The range of relative gains from smoothing corresponding to the 90% interval
of the distribution is comprised between −14.8% and 15.5% of total gains from risk
sharing; the corresponding range for the level effect is between −9.3% and 9.0%.
The level effect in panel (c), in turn, maps into the distribution of changes in
asset prices and the terms of trade, shown in the following two panels. In our analysis,
safer countries experience a relative re-valuation of their assets and an appreciation
of their terms of trade (right tail of asset gains’ distribution in panel (d) and left
tail of terms of trade distribution in panel (e)). Riskier countries experience capital
losses in their assets and a depreciation of their terms of trade (left tail of asset gains’
distribution and right tail of terms of trade distributions). The 90% interval for the
changes in asset prices ranges approximately from -1.8% to 1.9%; for terms of trade,
from -0.3% to 0.3%.
The main takeaway is straightforward. Tail risk enhances the relative gains
from capital market integration of countries that are more exposed to it–our empirically-
motivated exercise suggests that riskier countries have a potential relative gains advan-
tage for riskier up to 10 percentage points of the total gains from risk sharing. This
relative advantage however corresponds to significant differences in the sign, magnitude
and combinations of the SE and LE components of the gains across risky and safe
countries. In relative terms, the consumption smoothing component can contribute up
to a 15 percentage point advantage for riskier countries. The level effect component
produces relative gains and losses up to 10% of the total gains from risk sharing. Safer
countries may benefit from an average revaluation of their total assets just short of 2%
in excess to riskier countries.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have reconsidered the welfare and macroeconomic effects of insuring
fundamental output risk across borders, offering a decomposition of welfare gains into
a smoothing and a level effect, as well as a discussion of these effects by moments of the
distribution of output and by transmission channels. After mapping output risk into
income risk, highlighting the role of key structural features of the economy, we have
brought volatility, kurtosis and skewness in the distribution of output to bear on our
decomposition of the welfare gains from risk sharing. We articulate the level component
of these gains distinguishing between two channels: a relative wealth channel, reflecting
the revaluation of a country assets at the new equilibrium prices, and a terms of trade
channel, reflecting changes in the relative price of domestically produced goods. These
adjustments are the general equilibrium analog of the price of insurance that riskier
countries pay, safer countries obtain, when joining a capital market union. Either
type of countries gains from insuring aggregate risk, but the composition of these gains
differs. While riskier countries tend to gain mostly in terms of consumption smoothing,
they may lose out in terms of average consumption and labor effort.
Based on the empirical evidence for a large sample of countries, we offer an
assessment of the potential gains from macroeconomic risk sharing, decomposing them
by smoothing and level effects and by channels. In this exercise, tail risk features
prominently in shaping these gains. The distribution of relative gains is bi-modal. A
significant group of riskier countries benefit mostly from consumption smoothing, and
a significant group of safer countries benefit mostly from the level effects of capital
market integration.
In the majority of applied and policy assessments of the gains from capital
market integration, risk sharing is measured in terms of volatility and correlation of
consumption, sometimes in relation to the volatility of output, most often ignoring the
real exchange rate in breach of the theoretical condition for smoothing. Our analysis
clarifies that these indicators can at best provide an incomplete assessment of capital
market integration. By focusing on what we dub the smoothing effect of risk sharing,
they miss the main channels through which relatively safer countries gain. Provid-
ing macroeconomic insurance is rewarded with a larger share of world output to the
residents in the safer regions—corresponding to a rise in relative wealth and an appre-
ciation of their terms of trade. Looking forward, the challenge for the literature is to
devise indicators of these level effects, which we show are likely to play a non secondary
role in defining why many countries have a clear interest in achieving international risk
sharing, especially at times of heightened tail risk.
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A Higher-order accurate solution of the risk-sharing
constant
In the simple Lucas’ endowment model discussed in the main text, the risk-sharing




















In general, and specifically when there is production, the right-hand-side of equation
(A.2) is endogenous (e.g. the discount factor depends on consumption, and income
depends on production). Therefore, to find the risk sharing constant in this more
general setting we typically need to use some fixed-point algorithm.
We propose a closed-form solution for κ based on perturbation methods. We
present a version that is accurate up to second order but that is straightforward to
extend to higher orders. In describing our solution we follow a procedure that allows
for easy numerical implementation, e.g. using Dynare.
Our solution is based on the observation that κ depends on second order
terms, and in particular on the variance of the exogenous processes. We can thus







κ,t+1 = C̃2,t − C̃1,t (A.4)
28The term “constant” refers to time invariance. This coefficient is not invariant to risk.
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where κ̄ is the unknown parameter we want to solve for, and εκ,t, is a mean-zero iid





we have thus re-scaled the original kappa by σ2κ.
The second-order solution of a DSGE model can be written in a second-order
VAR form as (e.g. following Dynare notation)
yt = Ayt−1 +But +
1
2




where yt ∈ Rny is the vector of all the ny variables (endogenous and exogenous exclud-
ing innovations), ut ∈ Rni is the vector of all the ni (iid) innovations, A, B, C, D, F ,
G are conformable matrices, and for any column vectors x and z, (x⊗ z) is the vec-






, and ~· is the vectorization
operator.29
The key term in equation (A.5) is the last one, which shifts the mean of
variables in proportion to the exogenous risk, captured by the variance matrix Σ2 (also
referred to as the stochastic steady state in the literature).
Using regular perturbations (see e.g. Lombardo and Uhlig, 2018), none of the
matrices in (A.5) depends on exogenous risk. This means that the only place where σκ
appears is in Σ2.
The vector yt contains the variable measuring Arrow-Debreu securities. As-
sume the latter are in position iAD, and that σκ occupies position jσκ in the vector
~Σ2.
Then we have that
yt[iAD] = A[iAD, :]yt−1 +B[iAD, :]ut +
1
2
[C[iAD, :] (yt−1 ⊗ yt−1)
+D[iAD, :] (ut ⊗ ut) + 2F [iAD, :] (yt−1 ⊗ ut)] +
1
2
G[iAD, :] ~Σ2 (A.6)
where for a matrix X, X[i, j] denotes the element in row i and column j, and where
X[i, :] denotes the row i of matrix X; for a vector z, z[jσκ ] is the jσκ − th element in z.
In particular, ~Σ2[jσκ ] = σ
2
κ.
Note that if we set κ̄ = 1, we can solve for σ2κ that satisfies some restriction on
yt[iAD]. In particular we know that under complete markets it must be that y0[iAD] = 0
29To date, Dynare returns only the product G ~Σ2 in the variable “oo .dr.ghs2”. In order to im-
plement our algorithm this product must be factorized in the two components. This can be easily
done by modifying Dynare function dyn second order solver.m at about line 173, by adding a new
variable e.g. dr.G=LHS\(-RHS);, where LHS and RHS are variables defined in the function.
48
(Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012). One way to implement this condition is to assume that
at time 0 and -1 the economy was at the stochastic steady state, i.e. all elements of
equation (A.6) are zero except the last one, i.e.30
y0[iAD] = 0 =
1
2
G[iAD, :] ~Σ2 (A.7)








where j⊥σκ denotes all the elements excluding jσκ .
Now we simply need to swap values, i.e.
κ̄← σ2κ
σ2κ ← 1. (A.9)
With this assignment of values, κ is the second-order accurate risk-sharing constant
that implements complete markets.
Our proposed algorithm, correctly implements complete markets up to second
order accuracy. It should be noted also that our approach does not affect the first-
order solution. This solution correctly describes growth rates of variables, since the
risk-sharing constant is invariant to time (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012).
Our approach is reminiscent of the solution algorithm proposed by Devereux
and Sutherland (2011) (DS) to solve for portfolio shares up to second order. DS
introduce an auxiliary iid shock in the budget constraint of investors as a placeholder
for portfolio shares. By knowing the position of this auxiliary shock DS can then use
simple linear algebra to derive the shares. Although we solve a different problem, our
algorithm shares with DS the idea of using auxiliary iid shocks as placeholders for
parameters that would otherwise drop out of the perturbed solution.
30Equally easily implementable is any other condition, e.g. Ey0[iAD] = 0.
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B GHH preferences: Analytics
A large number of papers assumes that households’ preferences are such that there is no
wealth effect on labor supply, following the seminal work of ?, GHH. GHH preferences
are non-separable in consumption and labor, i.e. (for the Home country)








and an identical expression for the foreign country.
Under these preferences the first-order conditions (3.15a) and (3.15b) can be
written as







Lt : − UL(Ct, Lt) := χLφt UC(Ct, Lt) = wtλt, (B.3)
so that labor supply does not depend directly on the marginal utility of consumption.
Importantly, these preferences imply that the risk-sharing condition (??) does
not simply depend on relative consumption and the exchange rate, but on labor too,
i.e.
log ζ∗t − log ζt − logQt = log ζ∗0 − log ζ0 − logQ0 := κ̃GHH . (B.4)
The same technique discussed above can be used to solve for κGHH at any order of
approximation.
C Further Quantitative Results (CRRA preferences)
This appendix shows the effect of asymmetries in skewness and kurtosis under CRRA
preferences.
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Table 7: Home bias in consumption and home relative skewness of TFP - CRRA
preferences
φ†
Home-Bias 50% 60% 70% 95%
RGRSs††
0.2 0.0000 0.6266 1.2531 7.6504
0.75 0.0000 0.8052 1.6103 9.8310
1. 0.0000 0.7160 1.4321 8.7432
SEs††
0.2 0.0000 0.7147 1.4294 8.7264
0.75 0.0000 0.8932 1.7865 10.9063
1. 0.0000 0.8299 1.6599 10.1340
LEs††
0.2 0.0000 −0.0881 −0.1762 −1.0760
0.75 0.0000 −0.0881 −0.1761 −1.0753
1. 0.0000 −0.1139 −0.2278 −1.3908
Relative Gains in Asset Prices
0.2 0.0000 −0.0425 −0.0850 −0.5190
0.75 0.0000 −0.0096 −0.0193 −0.1177
1. 0.0000 −0.0054 −0.0107 −0.0654
Home Average Terms of Trade
0.2 0.0000 0.0405 0.0811 0.4949
0.75 0.0000 0.0076 0.0151 0.0923
1. 0.0000 0.0043 0.0087 0.0531
All measures are in percentages. n = 1
2
, θ = 1.5, ρ = 4, γ = 50%, φ∗ = 1 − φ, η = η∗ = 50%.
Fourth-order approximation.
† Columns refer to the distribution displayed in Table 1
†† Permanent consumption equivalent (pce) units relative to total welfare in pce units.
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Table 8: Home bias in consumption and home relative kurtosis of TFP - CRRA pref-
erences
η†
Home-Bias 50% 60% 70% 95%
RGRSs††
0.2 0.0000 0.9644 1.9287 3.2581
0.75 0.0000 1.2393 2.4785 4.1869
1. 0.0000 1.1021 2.2042 3.7235
SEs††
0.2 0.0000 1.0375 2.0749 3.5051
0.75 0.0000 1.2601 2.5201 4.2572
1. 0.0000 1.1227 2.2453 3.7930
LEs††
0.2 0.0000 −0.0731 −0.1462 −0.2470
0.75 0.0000 −0.0208 −0.0416 −0.0703
1. 0.0000 −0.0206 −0.0411 −0.0695
Relative Gains in Asset Prices
0.2 0.0000 −0.0281 −0.0562 −0.0949
0.75 0.0000 −0.0047 −0.0095 −0.0160
1. 0.0000 −0.0023 −0.0047 −0.0079
Home Average Terms of Trade
0.2 0.0000 0.0253 0.0506 0.0855
0.75 0.0000 0.0018 0.0035 0.0060
1. 0.0000 0.0008 0.0016 0.0027
All measures are in percentages. n = 1
2
, θ = 1.5, ρ = 4, γ = 50%, φ = φ∗ = 50%, η∗ = 1 − η.
Fourth-order approximation.
† Columns refer to the distribution displayed in Table 1
†† Permanent consumption equivalent (pce) units relative to total welfare in pce units.
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D Distribution of moments across countries
Table 9 shows the three moments of interest for the PWT9.1 list of countries. Country


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ARE = United Arab Emirates
ARG = Argentina













BOL = Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
BRA = Brazil
BRB = Barbados
BRN = Brunei Darussalam
BTN = Bhutan
BWA = Botswana





CIV = Cote d’Ivoire
CMR = Cameroon




CPV = Cabo Verde
CRI = Costa Rica










































KNA = Saint Kitts and Nevis
KOR = Republic of Korea
KWT = Kuwait
LAO = Lao People’s DR
LBN = Lebanon
LBR = Liberia
LCA = Saint Lucia
LKA = Sri Lanka
LSO = Lesotho
LUX = Luxembourg







































SLE = Sierra Leone
SLV = El Salvador





SYR = Syrian Arab Republic








TZA = U.R. of Tanzania: Mainland
UGA = Uganda
URY = Uruguay
USA = United States of America
VCT = St. Vincent & Grenadines
VEN = Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
VGB = British Virgin Islands
VNM = Viet Nam
ZAF = South Africa
ZMB = Zambia
ZWE = Zimbabwe
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